SAFETY REPORT

The Gulfstream IV operator had all the
appearance of a good operation but the
flightcrew lacked cockpit discipline

Paved
overrun

Main
wreckage

Flightcrew failure to review the checklist and release
the gust lock prior to the takeoff run of Gulfstream IV
N121JM on BED’s 7000-ft Rwy 11 as well as failure
to be time-sensitive and abort the takeoff before
running out of runway length led to destruction of
the aircraft and the deaths of all occupants aboard.

By Robert Sumwalt

NTSB Board Member
ATP/CFII/FE. Airbus A320, King Air 350, Boeing
737, Fokker F28, Fokker 100
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s often is the case in corporate aviation, the passengers were running a few hours late. The 2 pilots and flight attendant decided to pass the time
by ordering a pizza and eating in the comfort of the cabin
of N121JM, the Gulfstream IV they had operated for 7
years. When the billionaire principal showed up with 3
other passengers, they boarded the GIV for the 45-minute
flight to ACY (Atlantic City Intl, NJ).
The day had started with the expectation of it being an
easy day. The weather was good and there would be 4 short
legs with an early afternoon departure and an evening return. The crew departed ILG (New Castle, Wilmington DE)
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Gulfstream IV N121JM was frequently used for air transportation both
domestically and overseas by Lewis Katz, the well-known and highly
respected publisher of The Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper.

at 1325 edt for the short hop to ACY, where they picked up
the 4 passengers and flew them to BED (Hanscom Field,
Bedford MA). After the passengers attended a charity event,
the plan was to return them to ACY and then reposition the
Gulfstream back to its home base at ILG.
Tragically, the evening didn’t end that way. Steeped in
a lethal brew of carelessness and complacency, and fueled by poor cockpit discipline, the flightcrew members
attempted to take off without disengaging the flight control gust lock. During the takeoff roll, once realizing the
gust lock was still engaged, instead of promptly rejecting
the takeoff the pilots wasted valuable time attempting to

Source: Massachusetts State Police

NTSB finds widespread non-compliance with checklist use and
control checks, leading to this tragic BED runway overrun crash.

Time
(EDT)

Groundspeed
(kts)

Distance from
runway
threshold (ft)

Distance
to runway
end (ft)

Distance to
runway safety
area end (ft)

Airplane turns onto runway 11

2139:20

4

96

6915

7935

Brakes released and power increased

2139:34

9

200

6811

7831

Autothrottle engaged

2139:43

44

569

6442

7462

“Couldn’t get” comment on CVR

2139:46.6

65

898

6113

7133

80-kt call on CVR

2139:51.3

90

1516

5495

6515

V1 call on CVR

2139:57.5

119

2612

4399

5419

Rotate call on CVR

2139:58.9

125

2899

4112

5132

First reference to “lock” on CVR

2139:59.9

129

3113

3898

4918

FPSOV activated

2140:05.7

150

4479

2532

3552

Brake pressures start to rise

2140:10.0

162

5638

1373

2393

Peak groundspeed

2140:10.3

162

5694

1317

2337

Last reference to “lock” on CVR

2140:12.6

157

6315

696

1716

Power reduced

2140:14.0

156

6685

326

1346

Reference to stopping ability on CVR

2140:14.3

155

6763

248

1268

Airplane exits runway onto paved overrun area

2140:15.3

151

7011

0

1020

Thrust reversers deployed

2140:15.5

149

7072

-61

959

Airplane exits paved overrun area onto grass

2140:20.0

105

8031

-1020

0

Sound of impact on CVR

2140:21.0

97

8206

-1195

-175

End of FDR data

2140:23.9

90

8662

-1651

-631

n/a

0

8880

-1869

-849

Event

Surveyed main wreckage location

Time, Speed & Distance from Rwy Threshold chart showing takeoff time and crash time of GIV N1121JM at BED’s Rwy 11 during aircraft’s takeoff roll.

troubleshoot the problem. The delay in rejecting, along
with a poorly executed reject, led to a high speed overrun. The attempted flight ended—along with the lives all 7
onboard—as the aircraft careened off the runway end and
became impaled across the banks of the Shawsheen River.
The aircraft came to a dead stop, decelerating from around
90 kts to a complete standstill almost instantaneously. The
aircraft was immediately consumed in a fireball.

The accident sequence
The 2 Rolls-Royce Tay engines were started shortly after
the passengers boarded at 2128 edt. In the left seat was
the PIC, a 12 year full-time pilot of SK Travel, the private
holding company that managed the GIV for its 2 owners. The SIC was a 61 year-old SK Travel chief pilot and
director of maintenance who had been employed by the
owners for 27 years.
During the 11 minutes that elapsed between engine
start and reaching the runway, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) registered minimal verbal communications between the pilots and there was no discussion or mention
of checklists or flight control checks. As N121JM was
maneuvered on to BED’s Rwy 11, the PIC commented
that the rudder limit annunciation had appeared on the
engine instrument and crew advisory system (EICAS) display. Although the pilots may have realized this annunciation meant the rudder had reached its stop and could

not move further, they most likely did not realize it was an
indication the rudder travel was severely limited because
the gust lock was engaged.
When pushing the throttles forward for takeoff, the PIC
commented on difficulty setting takeoff thrust. The NTSB
determined the resistance was due to the throttles encountering the gust lock/throttle lever interlock that was
designed to prevent takeoff power from being applied
when the gust lock was on. At this point, the engines’
exhaust pressure ratio (EPR) was 1.42, whereas takeoff
target EPR was 1.7. Additionally, the throttles lever angle (TLA) position would have been approximately half of
where it should have been for a normal takeoff.
Despite difficulty setting target EPR and despite encountering this abnormal throttle lever position, the PIC
did not simply pull the throttles back and discontinue the
takeoff. Speed at this point was less than 50 kts so the
airplane could have easily been stopped. Instead, the PIC
engaged the autothrottles and possibly manually nudged
the throttles, which allowed the engines to accelerate to
1.6 EPR. Although this EPR setting was less than the target setting of 1.7 EPR, the PIC continued the takeoff run.
NTSB determined that engaging the autothrottle and possibly manually pushing the throttles acted to shear a pin
in the gust lock handle mechanism. This defeated the gust
lock/throttle lever interlock and allowed a higher power
setting even though the gust lock was still engaged.
When the GIV gust lock is engaged, the elevator is
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Diagram of a gust lock handle in the ON and OFF positions
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Cockpit location diagram of the gust lock itself for the GIV. Gulfstream
has redesigned and improved gust lock design for their newer models.

locked in the full nose-down position. As the aircraft
accelerated through 60 kts, the pilots missed a required
check to confirm that the elevators are free and the control yoke has moved from the full forward position to neutral as aerodynamic forces act on the elevator. Realizing
the yoke remained at the full-forward position could have
been another indication that something was awry.
The SIC called “rotate” at 125 kts. One second later the
PIC stated, “steer lock is on,” a statement he repeated 6
more times over the next 12.7 seconds. There is nothing
on the GIV known as a steer lock, so it is highly likely the
PIC was referring to the gust lock. When he made the 1st
“steer lock on” comment, the aircraft’s groundspeed was
129 kts and there was 3900 ft of runway ahead of him.
With the addition of the 1000 ft runway overrun, there
was 4900 ft of pavement ahead of him.
Now 6 seconds after the 1st “steer lock is on” comment,
the aircraft was accelerating through 150 kts, and hydraulic power to the flight controls was shut off with the flight
4
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power shutoff (FPSOV) handle. Gulfstream IV pilots know
once the engines are started, hydraulic pressure from the
engine-driven hydraulic pumps applies pressure to the
flight controls. Because of hydraulic loads on the gust lock
hooks, the gust lock cannot be released once engines are
started. If engines are started with the gust lock engaged,
the only approved method of releasing the gust lock is to
shut down engines, allow hydraulic pressure to fully bleed
down, then release gust lock and restart the engines.
However, around the Gulfstream community, many pilots knew of an unauthorized technique: If engines were
mistakenly started with the gust lock on, hydraulic pressure could be relieved by pulling the FPSOV. This would
supposedly kill hydraulic pressure to the gust lock hooks
without having to shut down engines. Although unauthorized in the first place, the technique was only intended as
a way to work around having to shut down engines at the
ramp, and never intended as something used while running down a runway at high speed.
It’s been now 11 seconds after the “rotate” callout, and
with a groundspeed of 162 kts, one of the pilots began
a moderate application of brakes. Just under 1400 ft of
runway remained at this point, but with the addition of a
1000 ft runway overrun, there was about 2400 ft of pavement ahead of them. Throttles were retarded 4 seconds
after the brake application. The PIC said, “I can’t stop it,”
which was the only verbal communication between the
2 pilots after the pilot first verbalized “steer lock is on.”
Then 5.5 seconds after brake pressure began to rise,
thrust reversers were deployed. This was as N121JM departed the runway at 151 kts and traveled onto the paved
overrun surface. By the time the aircraft departed the
paved overrun, groundspeed had decreased to 105 kts.
As the aircraft traveled across grass and a service road,
it sheared off 3 nonfrangible approach light stanchions
and part of the localizer antenna. The flight data recorder
(FDR) ended as the aircraft was still in motion at 90 kts,
likely indicating the aircraft came to a dead stop at it impacted the banks of the Shawsheen River.
Witnesses reported that the aircraft became engulfed in
flames “almost instantaneously.” The investigation determined that the impact forces were likely survivable but
the occupants succumbed to smoke inhalation and thermal injuries. The PIC was found kneeling on his seat with
his head leaning against the left cockpit wall. His oxygen mask compartment was found in the open position
with the oxygen mask laying on the floor near him. One
passenger was found in the aisle next to and facing the
forward entry door.
Like so many, it was a crash that should never have
happened. There are several protective layers of defense
intended to prevent such a catastrophe – layers such as
cockpit checklists and flight control checks, as well as an
aircraft system that was designed to prevent throttles from
being set to high power settings with the gust lock on.
However, as the investigation revealed, those protective
layers were riddled with holes.

Cockpit layers of defense
Releasing the gust lock is the 4th item on the GIV Starting
Engines checklist contained in the airplane flight manual
(AFM), as well as the FlightSafety checklist used by the pilots in training. Not only did the CVR reveal this checklist
was not verbalized, but neither of the 4 remaining check-
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Rwy 11-29 at BED Hanscom Field is 7001 x 150 ft plus there is
another 1000 ft of paved overrun before the abrupt encounter with
the raised bank of the Shawsheen River.

lists were verbalized either. Although it’s possible that the
checklists could have been accomplished silently, which
would have been contrary to their training which called
for “challenge-response” checklist execution, the NTSB
noted there was no discussion of checklists before, during,
or after engine start or throughout taxi, and there were no
cockpit statements recorded to denote the checklists were
completed. Furthermore, a contract pilot who had flown
with one of the pilots a few years before the crash told
investigators that the pilot did not use checklists, but rather, had memorized a way of doing things. The NTSB concluded “the crewmembers’ lack of adherence to industry
best practices involving the execution of normal checklists
eliminated the opportunity for them to recognize that the
gust lock handle was in the ON position and delayed their
detection of this error.” Obviously, there was a big hole in
the checklist layer of defense.
Another cockpit layer of defense that could have detected locked flight controls was, of course, the flight control
check. The FDR revealed no such check was performed
for this ill-fated flight. NTSB made an even more troubling
discovery when examining a quick access recorder. Of the
175 previous flights, a complete flight control check was
skipped on all but 2 flights. “Given that the flightcrew neglected to perform complete flight control checks before
98% of the crewmembers’ previous 175 takeoffs in the airplane, the flightcrew’s omission of a flight control check
before the accident takeoff indicates intentional, habitual
noncompliance with standard operating procedures,” stated the NTSB. Another big hole in the layers of defense.

Aircraft layers of defense
The final protective layer of defense that could have
prevented a takeoff with the gust lock engaged was a
throttle interlock that would prevent significant throttle
lever advancement with the gust lock on. However, this
layer was ineffective due to a defective design.
FAA certification regulations for transport category aircraft specify that if the gust lock is engaged, the system
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must “limit the operation of the airplane so that the pilot
receives unmistakable warning at the start of takeoff.” To
comply with that regulation, Gulfstream designed, and
FAA approved, a throttle interlock that was supposed to
prevent the throttles from moving more than 6 degrees
throttle lever angle (TLA) from the idle stop if the gust lock
was engaged. To put this movement into perspective, total
TLA range of movement from idle to full throttle on the
GIV is 59 degrees.
Post-accident testing on the accident airplane’s throttle
quadrant found the throttles could be moved to 22 degrees TLA with the gust lock engaged. Furthermore, NTSB
tested several in-service GIV’s with the gust lock on. Like
the accident airplane, the TLA of those in-service Gulfstreams could be moved 3 to 4 times greater than the
designed 6-degree limit. As a result, NTSB determined the
GIV gust lock system does not comply with certification
standards. Gulfstream is working to create a fix, which is
anticipated to be available in the coming months.

Deadly delay
Of course, it’s easy to look back after the fact and say
“if they had only done this.” True, but it is important to
dissect the sequence of events in order to discover ways
future crashes can be prevented.
Once on the runway, the pilots had an opportunity to
realize something was not right when the PIC had difficulty setting takeoff thrust. “Despite encountering this
abnormal throttle lever position, the PIC did not immediately call out the problem or call for a rejected takeoff,”
stated NTSB. Instead, he engaged the autothrottles and
possibly provided some manual force on the throttles to
achieve a somewhat higher thrust setting and continued
the takeoff run. “It is unclear why the PIC engaged the autothrottle, as it would seem extremely imprudent to continue a takeoff after encountering a substantial restriction
to throttle lever movement while setting takeoff power,”
stated NTSB. However, what is clear is the aircraft’s speed
was less than 50 kts and the takeoff could have easily
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been discontinued at this point.
Pilots are taught not to reject takeoff after V1, and for
good reason. After all, accident files are full of cases where
an aborted takeoff after V1 didn’t work out well. However,
one exception to this rule is if the airplane’s ability to fly is
in doubt. In the case of N121JM, the PIC was undoubtedly
aware that the gust lock was still on when he tried to rotate,
as evidenced by his calling out “steer lock is on” 7 times.
Having the gust lock on obviously would prevent the aircraft from flying, so a rejected takeoff would be the only
viable option at this point. However, instead of promptly
rejecting the takeoff, he elected to troubleshoot the situation while the aircraft was accelerating approximately 3.5
kts per second.
NTSB determined that if the takeoff had been rejected
immediately upon the PIC’s 1st “steer lock is on” statement or anytime in the next 11 seconds, and had the
proper RTO procedure been used, the aircraft could have
been stopped on the paved surface. However, as noted by
NTSB, “the flightcrew delayed initiating a rejected takeoff
for about 10 seconds, and a further delay of 4 seconds
existed between brake application and power reduction.
Therefore, the rejected takeoff was not initiated until the
accident was unavoidable.”

Probable cause
On September 9 NTSB met to deliberate the crash of
N121JM. The board adopted the following: “The NTSB
determines that the probable cause of this accident was
the flightcrew members’ failure to perform the flight control check before takeoff, their attempt to take off with
the gust lock system engaged, and their delayed execution of a rejected takeoff after they became aware that the
controls were locked. Contributing to the accident were
the flightcrew’s habitual noncompliance with checklists,
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation’s failure to ensure that
the GIV gust lock/throttle lever interlock system would
prevent an attempted takeoff with the gust lock engaged,
and the FAA’s failure to detect this inadequacy during the
Gulfstream IV’s certification.”
NTSB issued 3 safety recommendations to FAA, 1 to
International Business Aviation Council, and 1 to NBAA.
The 71 page report is available at www.ntsb.gov. As one
of the 3 board members who participated in adopting the
report, I filed a concurring statement, which is contained
in entirety in the sidebar.
On a personal note, in the 9 years I’ve been member of
the NTSB, I’ve been involved in deliberating upward of
150 or so transportation accidents. This one was particularly disturbing because it was so preventable. We’ve certainly seen operators who were trying to skirt regulations,
but this operator, I’m afraid, thought they were better than
they really were. Their comfort led to complacency. Complacency kills. And it certainly did in this case.
Robert Sumwalt was appointed to NTSB
in 2006 by President George W. Bush
and reappointed in 2011 by President
Barack Obama. He served as NTSB
vice-chairman for two years. Prior to
NTSB he flew for a major airline for 24
years and managed a Fortune 500 flight
department. He was a regular contributor to Pro Pilot for 21 years.
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Always use the checklist
Complacency and overconfidence can lead to disaster.

T

o all outward appearances, SK Travel had the hallmarks of a well-run
flight department. They were operating a top-of-the-line business jet.
They had long-time employment stability – something not often found
with small aviation departments. They did their training at FlightSafety
International instead of just trying to do it “on the cheap.” The chief pilot
was described as being very meticulous about the airplane’s maintenance. They had undergone 2 voluntary industry audits and were preparing for their 3rd audit, which is a remarkable feat.
The auditor for their 2nd voluntary audit had the following glowing
comments:
• “The Safety Management System (SMS) of this operator is
well-developed.”
• “Best practices are consistently employed in all facets of the program.”
• “Continuous SMS improvement is actively pursued.”
• “The flight operations manual is remarkably well-written and
comprehensive.”
• “Safety culture within the department is shared among all team
members.”
• “Open reporting of hazards is consistently encouraged by management.”
• “Solid safety program, maturing nicely.”
Despite these positive comments, our investigation revealed an operation in which checklists and flight control checks were not accomplished by
the flightcrew, as specified in their training and the aircraft operations manual. In order to successfully complete training, neither of these omissions
would have been acceptable. However, considering that each crewmember
successfully completed recurrent training 8 months before the crash, they
obviously knew and demonstrated they were aware of these requirements.
Given that they knew how they were supposed to operate, why did
these flightcrew members perform to the contrary? Why did they intentionally act one way when being checked, and perform another way—a
way contrary to basic good airmanship—in actual operations?
Complacency is one explanation that comes to mind. Perhaps an
overconfidence developed out of routine, wherein the flightcrew believed
their method of operations didn’t require these procedural items. Whatever the reason, the result proved catastrophic.
Although the flightcrew members may have become complacent, I
have to believe the owners of this airplane expected the pilots to always
operate in conformity with—or exceeding—training, aircraft manufacturer requirements, and industry best practices. Yet, as evidence showed
in this investigation, once seated in their cockpit, these crewmembers
operated in a manner that was far, far from acceptable.
There is a saying: “You can fool the auditors, but never fool yourself.”
These pilots made the critical mistake of attempting to fool both. And
this mistake was costly, unfortunate and tragic.
I hope the lessons from this crash can be used to emphasize the critical
need to combat complacency, eradicate intentional noncompliance and
perform like true professionals. Passengers who place their lives in the
hands of flightcrews deserve and expect no less.

